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Abstract 
 
WTO rules prohibit Free Trade Areas (FTAs) that provide tariff-free access or services liberalisation 
in only one or a few sectors. In this sense, a narrow, sectoral approach to concluding an FTA between 
the EU and the UK would contravene WTO law. However, assuming the EU and the UK were able to 
agree a substantially broad tariff-free FTA, WTO rules would not prevent them from moving further 
to maintain the bulk of the benefits of the Customs Union and the Single Market in a few key sectors. 
They could establish customs union-like conditions by coordinating external tariffs in some sectors 
and agreeing on relaxed Rules of Origin (RoOs) administered lightly and Single Market-like access 
could be approximated through sectoral Mutual Recognition Agreements. Such an approach would 
enable continued deep integration, whose desirability has been signalled on both sides. It would fall 
short of current market access levels even in the selected sectors and, in the case of tariff coordination, 
re-create some of the limits to an independent trade policy that Brexit aimed to remove. If the trade-
off were deemed desirable, however, the approach could be reconciled with WTO rules including the 
‘Most Favoured Nation’ requirement that equal treatment be awarded to all WTO Member States. 
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1. Introduction 
At the time of writing, eleven months after the UK triggered the two-year process of 
withdrawing from the European Union (EU), it has still not settled on its preferred EU trade 
arrangement. Different political factions and commentators have picked over options ranging 
from remaining part of the European Customs Union (CU) and Single Market (SM) to trading 
with the EU with no preferences at all, and all points in between – see, for example, Gasiorek 
et al (2016) and Holmes et al (2016).  
One solution advocated by the Prime Minister (HM Government, 2017b) and the main 
opposition party was that the UK should leave the CU and SM but conclude a very ambitious 
trade agreement with the EU. As of February 2018, this was termed ‘Canada plus, plus, plus’, 
a reference to the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 
which provides tariff free for most goods, mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) in some 
goods sectors and a little services liberalisation. The EU has indicated it could accept a 
‘balanced, ambitious and wide-ranging’ trade agreement - European Council (2017) para. 20. 
Yet ‘Canada plus, plus, plus’ would be asymmetric: preserving, as far as possible, existing 
frictionless trade in sectors that rely on it most heavily. Both parties are members of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and so any trade agreement between them must also be 
compatible with WTO rules and practices. For both goods and services, these require that 
agreements be both wide (covering many – but not necessarily all - sectors) and deep 
(offering meaningful liberalisation of trade). WTO rules also require that MRAs be made 
conditionally available to all WTO Members. Thus ‘Canada plus, plus, plus’ raises a question 
that is also more broadly applicable: to what extent do WTO obligations constrain countries 
from entering into sectorally-deep trade agreements?  
This paper addresses this issue directly, arguing that a deep but not comprehensive trade 
agreement would not necessarily violate WTO obligations. These obligations do rule out 
apparently politically convenient solutions such as selective tariff reductions or granting 
special market access solely for some companies. However, the rules are drafted and applied 
in such a way that the depth of the mutual liberalisation can vary significantly across sectors: 
that is, the UK and the EU could design a de facto WTO-consistent trade agreement that went 
some way towards preserving current trading conditions in a subset of sectors. While the 
parties may not be able to reach such an agreement, they should not dress political failure up 
as legal impossibility. 
We also consider approaches by which the UK and EU might pursue deep sectoral 
integration, and how such approaches would preserve, and fall short of, the benefits of the 
CU and SM. The CU and SM combine to enable the current free circulation of goods within 
the EU, a degree of integration far exceeding that attainable through any simple tariff-free 
Free Trade Area (FTA). The CU ensures zero tariffs between members and a common 
external tariff, which means that intra-EU borders posts are not required either to levy tariffs 
or to enforce rules of origin. The SM, which underpins the ‘four freedoms’ of movement for 
goods, capital, services, and labour contributes further through regulatory harmonisation, 
which ensures that goods may be exported without requiring additional certification, that 
customs procedures are harmonised, and that many services can be traded without hindrance 
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through approaches such as ‘passporting’ for financial services and mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications.  
Approximating this level of market access for selected goods would require agreeing a zero-
tariff FTA, and then agreeing to apply identical tariffs on imports from third countries in 
those sectors so that rules of origin could be very relaxed and customs procedures between 
the UK and EU very light.  The UK and EU would also need to conclude mutual recognition 
agreements (MRAs) in these sectors to avoid the need for extra testing of the goods they 
export to each other. Extending the arrangement to selected services (a clear economic 
priority for the service-intensive UK economy), would require the UK and EU to get their 
appropriate regulatory bodies to agree equivalent regulations and certification regimes, 
design a procedure to keep them equivalent as the regulations developed, and agree a credible 
and reliable dispute settlement process.  
There are caveats, however. First, selective tariff harmonisation will not eliminate all border 
posts and associated delays; absent a full CU and SM some checks will be needed to verify 
that goods are covered by the deep agreements and that they comply with tariff and 
regulatory requirements. Second, to relax or abolish RoOs (i.e. create CU-like conditions in a 
sector), the UK and EU would need to coordinate their tariffs on the relevant goods and all 
their significant inputs. Moreover, this applies not just to MFN tariffs but to all (existing and 
new) third-country FTAs and to trade defence instruments as well. Even absent a formal CU, 
such an arrangement would still constrain the UK’s discretion in determining its own trade 
policy. Third, given that many products have multiple end-uses, pursuing a CU for sector A 
would potentially spill over to sectors B, C, etc. Finally, for both goods and (most) services 
the conformity of UK production with EU regulations is implicit at present.  (It is achieved 
by proving that the products comply with UK standards, which, in turn, are identical, or 
deemed equivalent to EU standards.) This will now have to be done explicitly on a sectoral 
basis in order that the MRA can be signed in the first place, either by agreeing that regulation 
is equivalent, or, for goods, the more limited approach of agreeing that UK companies would 
be authorised to certify that products met EU standards, and vice versa.  
In the remainder of this paper, we examine these possible approaches to preserving deep 
sectoral integration for goods and services trade in turn. In both cases, we identify the 
relevant WTO disciplines on FTAs and mutual recognition, and how they operate in practice.  
 
 
2. WTO Rules and Practice on FTAs for Goods Trade  
With the UK having ruled out participation in the CU, the options for a UK-EU trade 
relationship have narrowed. If the parties wish to continue preferential trade treatment, this 
will be classified for WTO purposes as a Free Trade Area (FTA). Any such FTA will have to 
comply with WTO disciplines on Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs).4 RTAs enable 
                                                          
4 The WTO utilises RTA as an umbrella term; agreements that fall under the WTO mandate include ‘all bilateral, 
regional and plurilateral trade agreements of preferential nature’ including the Customs Unions and other Free 
Trade Agreements that Articles XXIV GATT considers – WTO (1996).  
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countries to grant each other preferential market access. This contravenes the Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) principle, a core WTO commitment whereby Members agree to treat all other 
Members equally. For trade in goods, Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) provides an exception to the MFN principle.5 It enables RTA Members, 
organised into a ‘customs union’, which has common external tariffs, or a ‘free-trade area’, 
which does not, to grant each other more favourable treatment as long as they meet 
established criteria. Primarily, RTA Members must not raise duties and other restrictive 
regulations to non-RTA Members (paragraph 5b), and must eliminate duties and other 
restrictive regulations on substantially all the trade between them (paragraph 8b).  
The GATT never fully enforced the provisions of Article XXIV. In recent decades, the 
proliferation of RTAs and their growing political and economic importance has continued to 
erode the appetite of the WTO to do so - see Winters (2015).6 The Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements, the WTO body which now oversees RTAs, is no longer charged with 
reviewing the consistency of RTAs with the GATT, but is restricted to requiring members to 
provide information to allow one member to tell whether it will be adversely affected by 
another’s agreements. Further, WTO Members have almost never formally complained about 
each others’ RTAs through the dispute settlement system. In the handful of disputes that 
evaluate the WTO-legality of RTA provisions, the WTO Appellate Body has, with the 
exception of Turkey – Textiles, – WTO (1999) – never concluded that an RTA does not meet 
requirements of Article XXIV. The WTO/GATT has never declared an RTA to be overall 
GATT non-compliant. 
Yet even a rule that is only weakly enforced may reduce the extent of bad behaviour (think of 
speeding laws). Moreover, the UK has set itself up as the champion of multilateralism and the 
WTO – Fox (2016) – and the EU has also sought to remain within the confines of Article 
XXIV in its FTA negotiations (European Commission, 2013: 4). There is no reason to expect 
the EU to depart from this past practice in its negotiations with the UK and so we ask what is 
possible within the confines of WTO law and practice.  
 
2.1 Applicability 
There is no dedicated WTO provision pertaining to the situation in which a customs territory, 
which the EU comprises, is replaced by an FTA. Indeed, replacing a customs territory with a 
less liberal arrangement goes against Article XXIV’s statement of purpose for RTAs, set out 
in the 4th paragraph: ‘increasing freedom of trade’ by ‘closer integration of the economies of 
the countries parties to such agreement’.  
A UK-EU FTA would uphold the stated purpose of Article XXIV if, rather than comparing 
the FTA with the current customs territory, MFN status is taken as the baseline, as the EU 
and UK would revert to this in the absence of a new trade agreement.7 The justification for 
                                                          
5 Interestingly it does so, however, not as an explicit exception to MFN but as a qualification to the definition 
of a customs territory, thereby reducing its political toxicity – see Winters (2015).  
6 According to the WTO website, as of 2016 all WTO Members are also members of at least one RTA: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm 
7 The adoption of such a baseline could be purely notional (imagining that one second elapsed between the 
dissolution of EU Membership and the conclusion of the FTA) or could be established by a very brief period of 
operating such a policy. 
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this approach is that an FTA would enable a closer level of integration than would be possible 
without such an agreement.The Appellate Body has referred explicitly to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’) as a source of customary rules of treaty 
interpretation. VCLT Article 31(1), frequently cited in WTO dispute settlement, states that: ‘a 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ 
[Emphasis added] – VCLT (1969). The employment of MFN status as a comparative baseline 
conforms with the object and purpose of Article XXIV. Article XXIV sets out a minimum 
level of liberalisation that RTA Members must attain to qualify for an exemption from the 
MFN obligations established in the GATT Agreement, and thus attain closer integration than 
countries would attain without an FTA. As long as the EU and UK meet these requirements 
they are in compliance with its purpose of ‘increasing freedom of trade’ 
In the recent Peru – Agricultural Products dispute, the Appellate Body stated: 
….In our view, the references in paragraph 4 to facilitating trade and closer 
integration are not consistent with an interpretation of Article XXIV as a broad 
defence for measures in FTAs that roll back on Members' rights and obligations under 
the WTO covered agreements - WTO (2015), para. 5.116.  
This statement underscores that WTO rights and obligations provide a minimum standard of 
liberalisation that FTAs should preserve. 
On this basis we believe that WTO Members can be persuaded to accept this approach. 
Practically speaking, the WTO has no formal authority to constrain the UK’s choice to leave 
the EU and it is highly unlikely that WTO Members would protest on the basis that the UK 
and EU have not achieved closer integration, as meeting this requirement would be 
impossible. 
 
2.2 Requirements 
As stated above, Article XXIV contains two key restrictions on FTAs. Countries can 
constitute such areas if:  
the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent 
territories and applicable … to the trade of contracting parties not included in such 
area …  shall not be higher [than] prior to the formation of the free-trade area. 
(Paragraph 5(b)).  
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce … are eliminated on substantially 
all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such 
territories. (Paragraph 8(b)) 
Paragraph 5(b) requires that a UK-EU FTA should not result in increased tariffs or other 
regulatory barriers to third countries. This precludes either party increasing its bound tariff 
rates. There are very few cases where an FTA has increased the restrictions on imports from 
non-members, possibly because the latter could so easily complain. Turkey’s raising of 
external tariffs prompted complaint in the only dispute in which the Appellate Body found a 
Member not in compliance with Article XXIV, Turkey – Textiles - WTO (1999). The UK has 
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indicated that it will ‘replicate as far as possible our current position as an EU Member State’ 
- HM Government (2017a): para. 9.18. On past precedent, the EU27 would not seek to 
change its concessions on signing an FTA – at least not upwards. Thus this condition is 
unlikely to cause problems. 
Paragraph 8(b) has two components – the elimination of duties and other regulations between 
partners and the coverage of substantially all trade. Again, duties should cause little problem 
for a UK-EU FTA. The parties currently trade with no duties (tariffs). If cooperation was 
great enough to negotiate an FTA in the first place, we might assume that there would not be 
any serious pressure to introduce them in any post-Brexit FTA.  
The meaning of the requirement to eliminate ‘regulations of commerce’ has never been 
clearly established.8 In practice, many FTAs make few efforts to reduce restrictive 
regulations at all – Epps (2014) – and no FTA has the depth of regulatory integration that the 
SM provides.9 If the UK asserts its regulatory independence by leaving the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and restricting the free movement of labour 
from the EU, the EU will want to pull back from the current high degree of integration. Even 
with a fair degree of retreat, a UK-EU FTA would more than satisfy current WTO practice to 
date. Further, as we have argued above, WTO MFN status, rather than the status quo, should 
act as comparative baseline. (We return to the SM in detail below when we deal with 
technical standards and their attendant regulations.) 
The second element of Paragraph 8(b) is its coverage of ‘substantially all the trade’. Years of 
discussion through GATT and WTO working parties, the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations and the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) have failed to  
resolve the definition of ‘substantially all’. Key debates centre on whether the definition 
should be quantitative (and if so what percentage10), qualitative, or on a case-by-case basis, 
and whether an FTA excluding agriculture can constitute ‘substantially all trade’.11 The 
Appellate Body in Turkey—Textiles decided, albeit in a case about a customs union, that the 
ordinary meaning of the term ‘substantially’ contains qualitative and quantitative elements, 
with the latter emphasised in relation to duties. It characterized ‘substantially all’ as not the 
same as all but considerably more than some - WTO (1999): paras. 48-49. Despite 
formulating these concepts, the Appellate Body refrained from applying them to an 
assessment of whether Turkey’s customs union covered ‘substantially all’ trade with the EU 
as defined by Article 8(b), as the Parties had not appealed the Panel’s ‘assumption’ that the 
EU and Turkey were in compliance – WTO (1999): para. 60.  
Thus examining the practices of WTO Members is instructive. In its FTAs with developed 
countries, the EU defines ‘substantially all’ as 90 per cent of its trade being tariff-free and at 
                                                          
8 Mathis (2006) argues that the phrase prohibits RTA Members from introducing additional trade restrictions 
not permitted under the WTO. This appears a reasonable interpretation to us. 
9 One might also infer that WTO members take a more severe line on duties than on ‘other restrictive 
regulations’ from the fact that the WTO Secretariat’s factual reports on RTAs present detailed data on the 
elimination of duties (almost always showing that ‘substantially all’ is satisfied) and then list many cases where 
‘other restrictive regulations’ persist, without the latter leading to any serious complaint. We rely on these 
factual reports in assessing what members expect on services liberalisation below. 
10 Proposals generally range from 80 to 90 per cent – see Sauve and Ward (2009), 22.  
11 See, eg, debate in Committee on Regional Trade Agreements regarding the FTA between Canada and EFTA – 
WTO (2010 b). 
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least some coverage of all sectors, even if minimal (Woolcock, 2007: 5).   Given a starting 
point of zero tariffs on mutual trade and the EU’s (and hence the UK’s) low MFN tariffs, a 
UK-EU FTA seems likely to be able to achieve this threshold quite easily. 
What paragraph 8(b) does clearly rule out, however, is sectoral deals whereby UK-EU trade 
in a few specific sectors received better terms than MFN. This principle is made clear in the 
2000 dispute Canada – Autos. Canada granted import duty exemption to vehicle 
manufacturers affiliated with manufacturers in Canada; upon joining an FTA with the US in 
1989 it closed the list of eligible manufacturers. The Appellate Body found that Canada was 
not in compliance with the Most Favoured Nation principle of GATT Article I:1 as it granted 
an advantage only to some products from some Members – WTO (2000): paras. 73-84.  
Paragraph 8(b) also implies that a UK-EU FTA cannot be constructed piece-meal, starting 
with narrow coverage and adding sectors as they are negotiated. ‘Substantially all’ must be 
satisfied from the start, although once it has been achieved, the initially excluded sectors can 
be added subsequently. 
 
2.3 Transitional arrangements 
Article XXIV contains separate classifications for FTAs and interim agreements leading to, 
or necessary for, the formation of a FTA. FTAs are defined in paragraph 8 as agreements in 
which ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated’, suggesting that 
negotiations should be concluded. In practice, however, countries do not declare FTAs under 
negotiation to be interim agreements, but rather full agreements with transitional periods.12  
Such transitional periods normally facilitate a move from trading conditions A to trading 
conditions B over a period of time, where B is known; this is partially managed by clauses in 
the Uruguay Round ‘Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV …’.There is an 
important difference, however, between this type of transitional period and the increasingly 
recognised need for a transitional arrangement for UK-EU trade.13  
In the UK-EU case, a transitional deal is necessary because it is most likely that within the 
two-year period effectively allowed for negotiating UK exit from the EU, there will not be 
time to agree, let alone sign and ratify, a comprehensive trade agreement.14 That is, the UK 
and EU will not know precisely what trading conditions B actually are and hence will not be 
able to submit an FTA text to the WTO. If, however, there is broad political agreement that a 
trade agreement will eventually be reached, there are two alternatives. Either UK-EU trade 
reverts to MFN status until it is agreed so that tariffs are increased for a period, only then to 
be reduced to zero again when agreement is reached. Or the UK and the EU seek a waiver 
                                                          
12 This may be because WTO-notified interim agreements are subject to more oversight with respect to plan 
and schedule than full agreements. As stated in paragraph 7b, if WTO Members find that an interim 
agreement is not likely to result in the formation of a free trade area, they can make recommendations; 
parties to the agreement are obliged ‘not [to] maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such agreement 
if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations.’ 
13 An early argument that transitional arrangements would be necessary is in UKTPO (2016) published in July 
2016. 
14 This timetable has been discussed in Szyszczak and Lydgate (2016).  
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from the WTO membership to continue UK-EU tariff-free trade for a finite period. Waivers 
are granted on the basis of consensus of WTO Members. While some might see the 
opportunity for short run mercantilist gains from insisting that UK-EU trade impose tariffs 
and then remove them, none can claim that permitting a waiver to avoid this negates their 
reasonable expectations from a previous agreement. Moreover, many would potentially lose 
if the UK and EU economies were seriously disrupted. UK and EU diplomats have expressed 
the intention to work together in the WTO to smooth the path of Brexit (Miles, 2017) and this 
could potentially include seeking a waiver for a forthcoming FTA.15   
Of course, even a simple goods-only FTA will not be possible unless both sides are willing.16  
The UK and the EU would need to work together to persuade the rest of the WTO 
membership to take a sympathetic view of the need for a transitional arrangement while they 
worked out the details of the FTA and of the fact that a UK-EU FTA will be unwinding trade 
liberalisation rather than extending it. In the subsequent analysis we assume that a substantial 
tariff-free FTA can be achieved, and consider how much further the EU and UK can go in 
maintaining benefits of the Customs Union and Single Market.  
 
3. Can individual sectors approach Customs-Union-like access? 
The critical difference between a customs union (CU) and an FTA is that the former allows 
goods, once inside the area, to circulate without facing any additional tariffs, as they will 
have faced the same tariff wherever they entered the CU. The latter cannot do this. If one 
member of an FTA has a zero tariff on, say, apples, while others have positive tariffs, 
exporters would seek to send their apples to the first country and serve the others from there. 
To avoid this ‘trade deflection’, FTAs have rules of origin (RoOs) to determine whether a 
good has been produced within a member country, in which case it is exempt from tariffs 
under the FTA agreement, or whether it has been produced outside, in which case it has to 
pay the tariff of the country of destination.  
Applying a RoO is straight-forward for simple goods like apples, but most manufactured 
goods are produced by combining many inputs, some of which may come from third 
countries. In these cases, the RoOs can be complex, but typically a product needs to contain 
60% local value added to be eligible for duty free import into the EU under the European 
Economic Area agreement and we might anticipate the same rule for the UK. Enforcing such 
RoOs means customs checks between the EU and the UK even in an FTA. These could be 
minimal if exporters are well-known to the customs authorities and their production methods 
have been inspected in advance. But even then there is the cost of periodic inspections and 
random border checks. Moreover, while such a solution is feasible for large flows - the cost 
of establishing origin is mainly a fixed cost which can be spread over a large volume of sales 
- for small, and even more so, one-off transactions, such an approach is not realistic and the 
                                                          
15 On the other hand, their first joint effort - 11th October 2017, to clarify the division of EU-wide tariff-rate 
quotas -  met fierce opposition from several members. 
16 From shortly after the referendum, UKTPO Fellows have stressed the premium on diplomacy in achieving an 
effective Brexit – see, for example, Lydgate, Rollo and Wilkinson (2016). 
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bureaucratic costs and resulting uncertainty can be proportionately very high – even 
prohibitive. 
This raises the question as to whether, if the UK and the EU agreed to maintain the same 
external tariff on a specific final good and all the significant inputs into it, that final good 
could be spared intrusive RoO procedures; that is, whether, for a specific sector, customs-
union-like conditions could pertain within an FTA?17 Note, however, that this would not 
address trade frictions associated with regulatory barriers, which we consider in section 4 
below.  
There is no WTO regulation that precludes two countries from having the same external tariff 
on a specific good, nor from co-ordinating to achieve that end. Indeed, providing that, as the 
UK government intends, the UK adopts the EU’s existing external tariffs, the trade partners 
will have de facto tariff coordination. Moreover, since preferential rules of origin within an 
FTA are essentially a matter between the partners (despite the fact that they may impose costs 
on other WTO members – see, for example, Krueger, 1999), there seems to be no barrier to 
their agreeing to express and operate those rules in a way that imposes rather little cost on 
market transactors. Thus, it is, in principle, possible to create customs union-like conditions 
for specific sectors within an FTA.18 
On the other hand, this approach implies a good deal of coordination. First, many goods have 
a large number of inputs; tariffs on all of these would need to be harmonised, including any 
preferential rates that are offered to developing countries or in FTAs with other countries and 
any  duties arising from trade defence measures. Second, there may be issues about inputs 
into those inputs: thus one might exempt tomato ketchup from RoOs if tomato paste faced the 
same tariff in both partners, but if one member produced tomato paste locally from imported 
tomatoes the other partner might wish to know that those tomatoes were facing the same 
tariffs as it imposed on its imports. Third, inputs such as tomatoes, may have uses in other 
end products, and the tariff chosen for the sake of the sectoral coordination may not be at all 
appropriate for those other users. That is, because tariffs cannot be varied according to the 
end-user, the tariff on any good needs to balance the interests of the sector seeking customs-
union-like access with those of other sectors. Fourth, the more open two markets are to each 
other, the more businesses agitate to ensure that they face reasonably equivalent market 
conditions for non-traded inputs such as electricity and for labour .This sort of problem besets 
any agreement to reduce barriers to mutual trade and was, indeed, one of the pressures 
towards deeper integration within Europe19. Many such differences are tolerated de facto, but 
                                                          
17 The high level of co-ordination and harmonisation among EU customs authorities was actually introduced 
under the Single Market programme – Leave Alliance (2016) - but it is designed to give effect to the benefits of 
the customs union and could, if desired, be continued without the SM architecture.  
18 Also since no tariffs would be changed if the UK and EU adopted this strategy, there would be no violation of 
Article XXIV.5(b) that an FTA should not increase protection levels against third countries.  
19 A telling illustration is the Commission’s insistence that before it would remove possibility anti-dumping 
policies on the countries of Central Europe, the latter would need to adopt almost all of the acquis 
communitaire – the body of EU (then EC) law: ’once satisfactory implementation of competition and state aids 
policies (by the associated countries) has been achieved, together with the wider application of other parts of 
Community law linked to the wider market, the Union could decide to reduce progressively the application of 
commercial defence instruments for industrial products from the countries concerned’. European Commission 
(1995), emphasis added 
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when potential partners are large like the UK, maintaining very open borders may be made 
conditional on some maintaining sort of equivalence. That is, deep trade integration may be 
sustainable only with constraints on other areas of policy.20  
A more fundamental shortcoming is that the requirement that even preferential tariff rates 
need to be coordinated if customs-union-like conditions are to prevail, effectively requires the 
UK and the EU to have FTAs with precisely the same set of third countries and to have pretty 
much identical conditions for the relevant goods.21 This strikes at the notion of an 
independent UK trade policy. For example, the EU allows Korean exports of goods tariff-free 
access, and if the UK did not, it would presumably want to impose RoOs to ensure that EU 
production using high proportions of Korean inputs could not freely enter the UK given the 
competitive advantage they would reap from cheaper inputs. This, of course, would 
undermine the customs-union-like conditions in that sector.  
Finally, while it would certainly benefit firms to avoid RoO certification, the extent to which 
this arrangement would actually manage to circumvent border delays is uncertain. Border 
checks will still be needed for other products transiting between the UK and the EU, and even 
if a given product doesn’t require RoO certification, border officials still need to verify that it 
qualifies for customs-union-like treatment and it may still be subject to queues while other 
products are checked.  
 
4. Regulations 
Tariffs are not the only friction in international trade – meeting regulatory conditions and 
proving that you have done so are in many cases far greater barriers to commerce -World 
Economic Forum (2013). Addressing these was the purpose of the European Single Market 
(SM). In this section we ask whether, as part of an FTA, the UK and the EU could agree to 
maintain SM-like conditions on specific sectors or whether doing so would violate any WTO 
non-discrimination rules. Our question is not whether the UK could remain part of the SM on 
exiting the EU. It is, rather, whether it could have SM-like access in selective sectors.  
 
4.1 Mutual recognition 
The EU has harmonised a great deal - but not all - of its Members’ standards for product 
safety and public protection. Goods regulated by standards that are not harmonised still 
circulate freely due to the principle of mutual recognition – European Parliament and Council 
(2008). Products from EU and EEA countries, as well as Turkey, are automatically exempted 
from national technical regulation. Unless a country can prove that an imported product does 
                                                          
20 Thus, for example, paragraph 20 of the EU’s Negotiating Brief of Article 50 states that outcomes should  
‘encompass safeguards against unfair competitive advantages through, inter alia, tax, social, environmental 
and regulatory measures and practices’. 
21 The alternative that the final and all the intermediate goods covered by a sectoral agreement were excluded 
from EU and UK FTAs with others is not workable: it would rapidly create more exemptions than were 
compatible with Article XXIV, it would complicate those FTAs, and for all the FTAs that currently exist, the EU 
has already committed to include those sectors in the FTA. 
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not meet its standards on public safety, health or the environment, it is assumed that standards 
are equivalent.22  
Although the principle of mutual recognition applies to non-harmonised Member State 
legislation, it comprises an essential component of the ‘four freedoms’ of the SM: the right to 
free movement of goods. It was established in order to ‘complete’ the internal market such 
that goods would travel as freely within the EU as they would in a national market; all EEA 
and EU countries are bound by the Mutual Recognition Regulation which gives effect to the 
principle.23 The extension of this principle to EEA countries, who do not have a CU with the 
EU, makes clear that the EU does not view CU-membership as an essential requirement. Nor 
does the EU view SM membership as essential, as the example of Turkey establishes. Turkish 
mutual recognition applies to the goods covered by the CU, but with certain exceptions such 
as pharmaceuticals – EC-Turkey Association Council (1996), para. 66; European 
Commission (2014) 106. (And, of course, the CU does not cover all goods.)  However 
Turkey has agreed to align its legislation with the EU acquis in the areas covered by the 
CU.24  
These examples suggest the UK could benefit from the mutual recognition principle in the 
absence of full sectoral coverage and a CU with the EU. Even if the EU were willing to agree 
to such an arrangement, however, mutual recognition for non-harmonized regulation does not 
equate with broad acceptance of regulatory divergence. On the contrary, divergence is only 
accepted for products not subject to EU harmonization. The UK would be expected to 
conform with the acquis in covered sectors, thus compromising its regulatory self-
determination.  
Less comprehensively, the EU and UK could agree to mutual recognition of goods on a 
sectoral basis. In general, the EU views the extension of MRAs for regulation to third 
countries as part of a larger process of harmonisation and market integration with the EU. 
While there is no promise that partner countries will eventually become EU Members, it will 
only undertake such MRAs in sectors where the regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures are aligned with the EU’s – Correia de Brito et al., (2016) 19.  
As members of the Single Market, the EU and UK currently have standards that are identical 
or deemed to be perfectly equivalent; indeed, their common history could offer cover for the 
EU and the UK favouring each other with quick agreements of a sort that other parties have 
been negotiating for years. More complex will be devising a dispute settlement system that 
precludes the CJEU having jurisdiction in the UK and creating arrangements that assure 
consumers and producers that standards and assessments will be mutually acceptable into the 
indefinite future, so that longer-term investments become possible. Most of that 
accommodation will have to come from the UK, as a much smaller market, but it might be 
eased by agreeing a forum or consultation procedure which obliged the EU to discuss future 
                                                          
22 ‘Mutual Recognition’, European Commission website at: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-
market/goods/free-movement-sectors/mutual-recognition_en 
23 ‘Free Movement of Goods’, European Parliament website at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_3.1.2.html 
24 The acquis is the entire body of rights and obligations binding on EU Members. European Commission 
website at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en  
The most recent WTO Trade Policy Review for Turkey documents its ongoing efforts to adopt the EU acquis - 
WTO (2016).  
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regulation changes with the UK. Clearly, however, a technical regulation MRA that either 
side could rescind on short notice offers a lot less long-term assurance than a legal 
requirement enforced by the CJEU, and so even if regulations do not change and there are 
consultation procedures, co-operative outcomes that were achieved under the Single Market 
may no longer be sustainable even under a very cooperative Brexit. That is, after Brexit one 
has to expect that some of the existing harmonisation of standards and mutual recognition 
will unwind.  
 A third option that better accommodates this unwinding is to negotiate Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRAs) on conformity assessment procedures. CAPs determine that the 
requirements imposed by technical regulation or standards have been fulfilled. They establish 
that EU product inspection, testing and certification can be done in the third country and vice 
versa. Such MRAs are more modest in ambition; they do not require that equivalence be 
established but simply avoid duplication in testing.  
However they do necessitate the Conformity Assessment Body in country A to be 
knowledgeable of the regulatory requirements of country B, and capable of fulfilling them, 
and vice versa. This requires a high level of mutual trust. While CAP mutual recognition 
promises to maintain EU regulatory requirements in foreign products and vice versa, even 
achieving this more limited goal has proven difficult. For example, negotiations between the 
US and the EU to grant mutual recognition of pharmaceutical inspections, such that a EU 
facility could produce a US-approved drug and vice-versa have taken years to conclude. 
Differences in drug approval procedures were difficult to overcome and the US was reluctant 
to concede that EU producers could meet its safety standards. In practice negotiations have 
included working toward areas of mutual standardisation - US Food and Drug Administration 
(2017), Van Norman (2016). The EU has succeeded in concluding MRAs in a few sectors 
with some countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the US and Switzerland, 
though many of these have been problematic or only partially functional in practice - Correia 
de Brito et al., (2016) 80.  
The UK and EU have established trust in one another’s CAPs already, which gives them a 
major advantage. The UK is unlikely to object, per se, to assessments of conformity to UK 
standards being conducted by EU laboratories. Its key its offensive interest will be to ensure 
simple and quick conformity assessments of its exports to the EU, ideally conducted by UK 
laboratories. This is not something that the EU will offer lightly. In its relations with 
countries in its eastern and southern neighbourhood, the EU has insisted that “Agreements on 
Conformity Assessment and Acceptance” of goods into free circulation within the EU  
requires the prior full alignment of the partner country's legal framework with EU 
legislation and standards and the upgrading of the implementing infrastructure in line 
with the model of the EU system, in relation to standardisation, accreditation, 
conformity assessment, metrology and market surveillance. (European Commission, 
2016)  
 
4.2 Would UK-EU MRAs on goods be compatible with WTO obligations? 
As previously confirmed, mutual recognition can establish that rules are equivalent (technical 
regulation MRAs) or that firms in both countries are capable of undertaking each others’ 
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conformity assessment procedures (CAP MRAs). Both types of agreements must comply 
with MFN provisions set out in the GATT, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement). If the regulations or CAPs covered under the MRA meet 
established criteria to be classified as ‘technical’, the TBT Agreement will apply; unlike the 
GATT, it contains articles that deal explicitly with conformity assessment procedures. MRAs 
concerning food safety, animal and plant health regulations fall under the SPS Agreement. 
Disputes on MRAs would almost always fall under the more specialised provisions of the 
TBT or SPS Agreements. However to make the analysis comprehensive, we first consider the 
issue of GATT compliance.  
GATT compliance 
With respect to the GATT, UK-EU sectoral MRAs, either on technical regulations or CAPs, 
are subject to compliance with its MFN principle, Article I:1.25 GATT Article I:1 requires 
that Member States should provide equality of competitive opportunities for imported 
products from all WTO Member States. A third party could complain that it was excluded 
despite having an equivalent ability to achieve a particular standard. Article I:1 does not take 
into account the policy rationale underlying a measure in dispute, but only its impact on 
competitive opportunities (see EC – Seal Products, Appellate Body Report, para. 5.82). Thus, 
the exclusion of a petitioning third country from an MRA, regardless of its policy 
justification, would likely contravene Article I:1 in many cases – see also Zell (2016).    
If this were to occur, MRA members would have recourse to GATT exceptions. This includes 
Article XXIV, which establishes that regional liberalisation is the aim of RTAs (paragraph 4) 
and requires RTA members to remove restrictive regulations of commerce between them 
(paragraph 8b). However, the case law establishes a high threshold for applying this 
exception. The Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles concluded that members of a customs 
union could act inconsistently with GATT provisions only if ‘the formation of that customs 
union would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue’ - WTO 
(1999b): para. 58. It applied this criterion in reference to Turkey’s introduction of additional 
trade barriers to third countries. If this same threshold were applied, the UK and EU would be 
required to establish that the MRAs were necessary for the FTA to be concluded. There are 
certainly FTAs that achieve tariff reduction with no mutual recognition.  
Even if the UK and EU were able to argue that MRAs were necessary, there is another 
problem: it is unlikely that the Article XXIV exception would be available under the TBT 
Agreement,26 which will act as lex specialis in many MRA disputes. The Appellate Body 
would want to avoid the asymmetry of providing an exception for regional integration that 
applied only when a disputed MRA happened not to be adjudicated under the TBT 
Agreement.  
                                                          
25 Article I:1 requires that ‘…. any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to 
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally 
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.’ 
26 While this has never been clarified explicitly, the Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles examined whether 
Article XXIV provided an exemption from GATT provisions, adopting a narrow approach to the scope of 
covered agreements – para. 58. 
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Instead a party to a closed MRA would need to establish that recognising third country 
regulation or conformity assessment would undermine its ability to uphold its desired level of 
protection in a regulatory area falling under the GATT General Exception, Article XX. This 
permits trade-restrictive measures that fall under listed public policy objectives, e.g. human 
health and conservation of natural resources, if they fulfil additional non-discrimination 
criteria established in its chapeau.27  
Since the WTO was established there have been no Article I:1 disputes on MRAs. However 
EC – Tariff Preferences (2004) is instructive in that it dealt with market access conditioned 
on exporting countries’ achievement of particular public policy goals. As part of its 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries, the EU awarded 
preferential tariffs for developing countries if they met standards on protection of labour 
rights and the environment, as well as efforts to combat drug production and trafficking. India 
claimed that the EU was discriminating by providing tariff preferences to Pakistan and not to 
India. This dispute fell under the 1979 Enabling Clause which authorises extending more 
favourable treatment to developing countries. The Appellate Body analysed whether the EU 
could provide preferential tariff treatment only to some developing countries and comply 
with the Enabling Clause’s non-discrimination requirement. It considered whether the 
countries were similarly situated and had similar needs – WTO (2004a) paras. 154-165. The 
basis of the Appellate Body’s finding of discrimination was that the EC had a closed list of 
beneficiaries and there were no objective criteria or standards for inclusion on the list –paras. 
187-189.  
An MRA dispute would differ in factual and legal respects. It would focus on comparability 
of regulatory bodies and approaches rather than domestic situations more broadly. The 
market access ‘reward’ would consist not just of lowering tariffs but some ceding of 
regulatory oversight. The Appellate Body would certainly appreciate that countries require 
detailed scrutiny before allowing third parties into an MRA. Nonetheless it is likely that it 
would require objective and transparent criteria in order to avoid ‘closed list’ MRAs, a 
requirement applicable as well in the context of the TBT and SPS Agreement provisions 
examined below 
This interpretation is supported by GATT disputes that have focused on equivalence more 
narrowly. In US – Shrimp the US required that its trade partners install a device on fishing 
nets to exclude, and thereby protect, sea turtles. In the context of the GATT Article XX 
chapeau, the Appellate Body found that the way that the certification was administered was 
unfair, as trade partners were not notified of whether they had been certified nor provided 
with the rationale or given the opportunity to respond – WTO (2001): paras. 163, 166, 172.  
Yet there is also a burden on complaining countries to establish that they can fulfil the 
requirements of the regulator. This is made explicit in the TBT and SPS Agreement 
provisions examined below. A pre-WTO GATT dispute, EEC – Beef from Canada, suggests 
this would be required under GATT as well. Canada complained successfully that the EEC 
had violated the GATT MFN Principle – GATT (1981): para. 4.2(a). The EEC specified a US 
                                                          
27 Article XX exempts measures that fulfil a closed list of objectives including those ‘(a) necessary for public 
morals; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; and (g) relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources…’.as long as they do not constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade….’ 
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product standard that met its definition of ‘high quality’ cut in its regulation, and noted only 
one certifying agency for the meat entering the EEC, which was located in the US. While 
finding this discriminatory, the GATT Panel also made clear that an important component of 
its decision was the fact that Canada could certify that the meat it proposed to export ‘met the 
exact product specifications required for access’.28 Canada was required to establish that it 
could fulfil the requirements to be automatically certified as meeting EEC product standards.  
 
TBT Agreement compliance 
The TBT Agreement contains dedicated provisions on technical regulation (Articles 2-4) and 
conformity assessment (Articles 5-9). The TBT Agreement’s MFN provision on regulation, 
Article 2.1, differs slightly in wording from GATT Article I:1.29 The implied obligation is 
substantively the same: to avoid providing more favourable treatment to some trade partners 
through closed MRAs not available to third parties with equivalent standards. TBT 
Agreement Articles 2.1 and 2.2 provide grounds to argue that a trade-restrictive measure is 
justified on the basis that it flows from a legitimate regulatory ‘distinction’ (TBT Article 2.1) 
or ‘objective’ (TBT Article 2.2). While the TBT Agreement does not contain a General 
Exception (such as GATT Article XX), it aims to strike a similar balance between avoiding 
obstacles to trade and allowing Members the right to regulate – WTO (2012b): para. 96.  
TBT Article 2.7, a dedicated provision on technical equivalence, provides a qualified 
obligation to ‘give positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations of 
other Members’ but only if they are satisfied that they ‘adequately fulfil the objectives of 
their own regulations’. Absent any disputes clarifying this requirement, Schroder proposes 
that regulators should compare the equivalence of: the regulatory goals, the results of the 
regulation and the means to achieve the goals – Schroder (2011) 124. 
Article 6 on Recognition of Conformity Assessment Procedures parallels TBT Article 2.7 
though applying directly to CAPs. Article 6.1 states that Members shall accept different 
conformity assessment procedures ‘…provided they are satisfied that those procedures offer 
an assurance of conformity with applicable technical regulations or standards equivalent to 
their own procedures.’ Article 6 recognises further conditions for acceptance that include 
negotiation (‘prior consultations’) to ensure confidence and reliability. The obligation is on 
third parties to ‘offer an assurance of conformity’. Article 6.3 also states that Members ‘are 
encouraged’ to ‘enter into’ negotiations for CAP MRAs, but such Agreements must provide 
‘mutual satisfaction regarding their potential to facilitate trade’.  
 
SPS Agreement compliance 
The SPS Agreement places a more precise obligation for cooperation on importing countries. 
Article 4.1 requires that Members shall accept other Members’ regulations as equivalent if an 
exporting Member ‘objectively demonstrates’ equivalence. As under the TBT Agreement, the 
exporter must establish that its measures meet the objective, defined here as ‘appropriate 
                                                          
28 Ibid at para. 4.1.  
29 Article 2.1 requires that ‘Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported 
from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.’ 
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level of protection’ as determined by the importing country, a requirement which is difficult 
to fulfil. Equivalence differs from mutual recognition in that it does not require bilateral 
assessment  - Schroder (2011) 142. Article 4.2 also stipulates that ‘Members shall, upon 
request, enter into consultations…’ to recognise multilateral or bilateral equivalence. Article 
4 was further clarified by a 2001 ‘Decision on Equivalence’, which requires countries to 
describe their objectives, desired level of protection and risk assessment procedures, and 
provide exporters reasonable access to relevant procedures – WTO (2004). Members must do 
this quickly without disrupting existing imports.   
There have been no complaints dealing directly with Article 4 violations. The legal status of 
the Decision on Equivalence is uncertain, although the Panel in US – Poultry has concluded 
that it does not bind Member States – WTO (2010a), paras. 2.5-2.16. Also, despite the 
exhortations of Article 4.2, establishing equivalence on a bilateral or multilateral basis has 
proved elusive in practice due to authorities’ attachments to their own national regulatory 
approaches. For this reason equivalence agreements are few in number and often narrow in 
scope – Echols (2013) pp 97-99. As in the case of technical regulations, however, the 
integration of UK and EU SPS measures puts them well ahead of other trade partners with 
respect to these kinds of obstacles.  
 
Existing MFN obligations on the EU 
These MFN obligations also pose a challenge to the EU’s existing principle of mutual 
recognition, available only to a subset of WTO Members. One possible line of defence is that, 
as a contracting party and customs territory in its own right, the EU is exempt from extending 
the treatment provided within the EU to third countries on an MFN basis. However such an 
argument is undermined by the fact that products from Turkey and the EEA also receive 
automatic mutual recognition. Bartels (2005) concludes that the EU principle of mutual 
recognition contravenes GATT Article I:1. Further, he concludes, if the EU unjustifiably 
rejects a request from a third country to recognise the equivalence of its technical regulations 
or conformity assessment procedures this would violate the TBT Agreement. In order to 
bring the EU into conformity with these obligations, Bartels calls for it to make its principle 
of mutual recognition conditionally available to all WTO Members – Bartels (2005) 719-720.  
In this sense, a move to negotiated, sectoral MRAs between the UK and EU actually seems 
more compatible with MFN obligations than does comprehensive, automatic mutual 
recognition, as long as these MRAs were in principle open to other WTO Members.  
In practice, the EU could maintain the exclusivity of its principle of mutual recognition 
simply by upholding the existing requirement that countries who wish to benefit must 
implement the EU acquis. However the deeper problem that this analysis reveals is the 
inadequate recognition in the TBT and SPS Agreements that regional integration necessitates 
a greater level of regulatory harmonisation than that available to all WTO Members – see 
Howse (2015). Instead, countries must resort to defending closed MRAs on the basis that 
other countries cannot meet their regulatory standards. Yet in practice the WTO has not 
presented any obstacle to regional regulatory integration, simply because there have been no 
WTO complaints on the principle of mutual recognition as applied by the EU, nor on 
negotiated sectoral MRAs in the EU or more broadly. It is unclear whether there is tacit 
acceptance of the exclusivity of the EU SM, or whether requests for equivalence from third 
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countries will arise imminently, as Bartels (2005) predicted. From a legal realist perspective 
it is difficult to imagine that the WTO dispute settlement bodies would want to undermine the 
functioning of the SM. 
 
5. Services and GATS Article V 
Services trade agreements are governed by GATS Article V, which differs from Article 
XXIV in that it does not refer to Regional Trade Agreements but rather to ‘Economic 
Integration Agreements’ (EIAs)30. Also, GATS does not distinguish between customs unions 
and free trade areas: most services are not subject to tariffs and border measures, rendering 
the distinction meaningless. The objective of Article V, as implied by paragraph 1, is ‘an 
agreement liberalising trade in services.’ As it is more or less inevitable that a UK-EU EIA 
would undo some of the services liberalisation achieved previously, it would not meet this 
minimum threshold, such that the UK and EU would need to establish a different baseline. 
The obvious way of doing this is to utilise WTO GATS schedules applied to all WTO 
Member States.  
5.1 The degree of liberalisation 
The legal constraints imposed by the WTO in negotiating a sectoral deal for trade in services 
are similar to those for goods. GATS Article V operates mutatis mutandis to GATT Article 
XXIV. Parallel to GATT Article XXIV(5)b, paragraph 4 prohibits Members from raising 
barriers to trade in services for non-Parties to the EIA. The Article also, in paragraph 1, 
requires broad sectoral coverage and non-discrimination; the extent of its reach in both 
instances hinges around the interpretation of the term ‘substantial’. The basic requirements 
for compliance with Article V have not been precisely codified by Member States or subject 
to interpretation by the Appellate Body.  
 
Substantial sectoral coverage 
Rather than GATT Article XXIV’s ‘substantially all trade’, Article V requires ‘substantial 
sectoral coverage’. The footnote to paragraph 1a states that this is constituted by number of 
sectors (implying that not all sectors need to be covered), volume of trade affected and modes 
of supply, and that there should not be a priori exclusion of any of the four modes of supply. 
The modes are 1) cross-border supply; 2) consumption abroad; 3) commercial presence; and 
4) presence of natural persons.  Other than in Mode 1, the value of services trade cannot be 
straightforwardly quantified still less simply added up; this explains the emphasis on 
liberalisation across sectors rather than simpler ‘substantially all the trade’ that pertains to 
goods RTAs. Even so, it is still not clear which elements of trade in services (sectors, trade 
volumes, modes of supply) require quantitative and which qualitative assessment and, as with 
goods, precise thresholds have never been established. There is nothing to prevent a very 
uneven approach to liberalisation within the different modes, as long as no Mode is entirely 
excluded. In most EIAs there is greater ambition within modes 1 and 2 than in mode 3, and 
mode 4 commitments are often only marginal - Cottier and Molinuevo (2008) 133-4. Further, 
                                                          
30 In the WTO’s RTA database, agreements that cover both goods and services are flagged as both “FTA & EIA”. 
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even if a sector is listed as liberalised, this still allows the possibility that commitments 
extend to only one of its sub-sectors – see Wang (2012), 427.  
 
Substantially all discrimination 
Within the sectors that are included in the ‘substantial sectoral coverage’, EIA members must 
eliminate ‘substantially all discrimination, in the sense of Article XVII’; namely, treating 
‘like’ services of EIA members no less favourably than domestic ones. This can be seen as a 
vertical requirement: within the covered sectors there must be depth of liberalisation.  
The requirement to eliminate ‘substantially all’ discrimination indicates that some subsectors 
can be exempted. But it is unclear how deep EIA Members must go vis-à-vis existing GATS 
commitments to non-discrimination. Paragraph 1(b) contains two very different thresholds. It 
states that EIA members can eliminate substantially all discrimination by ‘eliminating current 
discriminatory measures and/or prohibiting new or more discriminatory measures’ [emphasis 
added].  Eliminating all discriminatory measures suggests near total merging of the domestic 
market with the foreign market(s): there would be no discriminatory barriers e.g. to cross-
border sales, consumption abroad, establishing firms and movement of persons. Simply 
prohibiting new or more discriminatory measures, on the other hand, suggests that a standstill 
will suffice: that is, avoiding ‘GATS-minus’ outcomes.31 Article V prohibits discrimination 
‘in the sense of GATS Article XVII’, which applies only to specific commitments identified 
by WTO Members in their GATS schedules.  
The use of the word ‘or’ cannot be ignored. However, it seems difficult to imagine that an 
EIA that contained only standstills would meet the drafters’ intentions. Paragraph 1 makes 
clear that EIAs liberalise trade in services, a point echoed by the Panel in Canada - Autos – 
WTO (2000), para. 10.271. An interpretation suggested by Cottier and Molinuevo is that the 
first obligation should apply to sectors in which there are many discriminatory measures and 
the latter to sectors where there is little discrimination – Cottier and Molinuevo (2008) 136-
137. But the message for countries negotiating EIAs is that Article V does not establish a de 
jure requirement to eliminate all discriminatory barriers.  
Another unsettled area concerns market access commitments. WTO Members determine 
which of their service sectors will be subject to GATS Article XVI commitments to remove 
six categories of mainly quantitative restrictions on foreign services and capital. The text of 
Article V does not mention Article XVI, suggesting that it does not apply. However there is 
no clear line separating market access from non-discrimination commitments and in practice 
there are overlaps – see Muller (2016). Also, the WTO Secretariat has considered reduction 
of market access barriers as contributing to the liberalisation achieved by an EIA; see, for 
example, Factual Presentation of the EU – Korea FTA – WTO (2012).  
The dispute settlement bodies have enforced the non-discrimination requirement only once, 
in a Panel finding that was not appealed. The Panel in Canada – Autos concluded that 
Canada’s conditioning of access to an import duty exemption could not be justified under 
GATS Article V:1 – WTO (1999a): paras 10.269–10.272. The exemption was awarded within 
only one sector: vehicles. Within that sector it was awarded only to a small number of service 
                                                          
31 See Adlung (2015) on GATS-minus clauses in RTAs. They are not as rare as one might expect.  
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providers associated with companies which met particular export criteria. Canada argued that 
the measure could be defended as part of an FTA (NAFTA), but the Panel decided it failed 
meet the requirement of eliminating substantially all discrimination, asserting that members 
of an EIA should not discriminate between service suppliers (Panel Report, para. 10.270). 
Clearly, singling out some service providers for duty exemption within a particular sector in 
an EIA contravenes GATT Article V. Note that this decision applied only to the sector in 
question; the Panel did not conclude that NAFTA as a whole contravened GATS Article V.  
 
5.2 GATS and Mutual Recognition 
GATS Article VII addresses MRAs in services; Article VII:2 includes the tentatively-worded 
obligation that a party to an MRA “shall afford adequate opportunity for other interested 
Members to negotiate their accession to such an agreement or arrangement or to negotiate 
comparable ones with it. “Article VII.3 also provides for non-discrimination ‘in the 
application of … standards or criteria for the authorisation, licensing or certification of 
services suppliers.” There have been no disputes to elaborate these provisions and it has been 
speculated that the lack of disputes is because the ‘burden of persuasion’ for third countries to 
establish that they should receive better than MFN recognition is perceived to be too high - 
Marchetti and Mavroidis (2010), 423.    
 
5.3 Assessing the GATS compliance of a UK-EU EIA 
Given the uncertainty about how to interpret the GATS’ legal provisions on EIAs and the 
absence of any rulings from the Appellate Body, we turn to the actual practice of members 
and Secretariat for guidance. This is clearly not definitive about how a UK-EU EIA would be 
viewed, but precedent does carry some weight in WTO proceedings as does, in the case of 
assessing RTAs and EIAs, the old adage that ‘people who live in glass houses should not 
throw stones’.  
As noted above, the WTO review procedure is now restricted to the Secretariat providing 
information to members, from which they can draw their own conclusions. The information 
that the members seek and the Secretariat provides through this process may be taken as a 
reasonable guide to what they consider important in making an assessment. Even ignoring the 
points above that a sector is covered even if only one sub-sector is included in the 
liberalisation and that ‘eliminating substantially all discrimination’ does not mandate 
precisely national treatment in all covered sectors, actual practice appears to offer 
considerable comfort to the notion that an EIA with the depth of integration varying over 
service sectors would be acceptable to the WTO membership. We base this view mainly on 
the Secretariat’s Factual Presentation of the EU-Korea FTA (WTO, 2012a) but that on the 
EU-Peru FTA (WTO, 2013) suggests similar criteria.32 
                                                          
32 We do not analyse the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada or the 
EU-Switzerland agreements for this purpose because they have not been subject to Secretariat analysis, the 
former because it is too recent and the latter because only the simple trade agreement was subject to review 
(in 1973), rather than the totality of the over one hundred further partial agreements that followed it. Besides 
the EU is thought to be clear that it does not wish the UK to have a relationship like that with Switzerland – 
Owen et al (2017).  
20 
 
We start by considering schematically a single service sector, such as health provision, 
banking or telecoms, and imagining that the degree of restriction can be collapsed into a 
single scalar measure, which we represent on the vertical axis of Figure 2(A). No country 
fails to regulate these sectors internally – that is, national suppliers are required to obey some 
(generally perfectly justifiable) restrictions on their behaviour. We denote this level of 
restriction as ‘national’ in the figure. At the other end of the scale, a WTO member must 
record in its GATS schedule the maximal amount of restriction that it will impose on services 
and service providers from abroad, up to and including infinity (unbound).  As Borchert 
(2016) has observed, however, there is very considerable binding overhang, such that applied 
policies towards services imports are typically less restrictive than scheduled commitments. 
Both of these levels apply on an erga omnes (MFN) basis to all foreign countries. In addition, 
within the EU, and often as part of the Single Market, EU member states afford each other 
less restrictive regulations than general, which we label ‘EU partners’. This may be the same 
level as applied to nationals – as, for example, in financial services whereby establishment in 
one member state is sufficient to have a ‘passport’ to operate in another – or more restrictive 
– as, for example, with the provision of legal services in which several members states 
impose residence/nationality requirements – European Commission (2017). It will never 
exceed, however, the restriction applied at the MFN applied level33.  
 
  
                                                          
33 One is tempted to argue that the rights given to EU partners will never be less restrictive than those 
accorded to nationals. However, in at least one case outside trade, this is not true: the UK’s restrictions on 
residents bringing their non-citizen spouses into the UK are more restrictive than those it applies to nationals 
of other EU members! In the following analysis we ignore such perversities.  
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Figure 2: Levels of Restriction in a Single Services Sector 
(A)  At present    (B) Following a UK-EU EIA 
 
 
 
 
 
Now suppose that the EU signs an EIA which defines the level of regulatory restriction that 
will pertain to imports of services from the UK. This might be anything from merely binding 
the GATS schedule to offering identical conditions to those facing nationals, but if the EIA is 
to mean anything it will require that this does not exceed, and in at least some sectors is lower 
than, the restrictions offered on an applied basis to all WTO members.34 Further, because the 
Single Market is so deep – including, for example, the free movement of workers and 
supranational enforcement via the CJEU – the EU’s offer to the EIA partner is almost bound 
to imply effectively less integration (more restriction) than the Single Market level in most 
sectors. Figure 2(B) sketches in a notional EIA agreement on the illustrative service trade.  
In assessing the compatibility of the EIA with GATS provisions, Article V(1) might seem to 
imply that in every covered sector the EIA must deliver liberalisation to something like the 
national level. However, Article V (1) requires the absence of discrimination ‘in the sense of 
Article XVII’, which arguably covers only a subset of the issues that may be covered by the 
legal treatment of nationals or even of those covered in the Single Market. In other words, 
‘national treatment’ may entail a level of restriction above what we have termed ‘national’ or 
even above our ‘EU partners’ level. We do not have to settle this question here, but for 
concreteness we show the degree of liberalisation required of an EIA under the most 
demanding interpretation, labelling it as ‘maximal de jure Article V’. Clearly, on this basis, 
the EIA agreement for our illustrative sector would fail the test of eliminating existing 
discrimination.  
In presenting the EU-Korea FTA, however, the Secretariat declares that ‘the EU's 
commitments cover, at least partly, a large range of services sectors’ (paragraph 99) and that 
‘The list of commitments made by Korea …. covers, at least partly, most sectors’ (paragraph 
102). It then notes that ‘The specific commitments by the Parties in the Agreement are based 
on their GATS commitments, …. For certain sectors (and sub-sectors) coverage is enlarged, 
                                                          
34 Even if the EIA is not more liberal than the applied MFN provision, binding it is still valuable.   
Level of restriction 
implied by 
Level of restriction 
implied by 
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while, for a number of sectors (sub-sectors) already covered, new commitments are made or 
certain GATS-limitations are withdrawn’ (paragraph 104) and it ‘compares [the Parties' 
specific commitments] with their GATS schedules’ (paragraph 105).35 That is, the measure 
that the Secretariat uses for defining a sector as covered is that the EIA improves upon the 
GATS scheduled degree of restriction – i.e. that the distance we have labelled as the ‘de facto 
measure for Article V’ in Figure 2(B) exceeds zero. Given that no challenge has been made 
to the EU-Korea FTA, we might take it that its standard is acceptable to WTO members. 
Moreover, given that in most sectors, EU and UK applied MFN policies are already more 
liberal than scheduled policies, even an EIA that merely committed to current applied levels 
would seem to satisfy the de facto standard.  
Given that nearly all sectors should meet the standard, there is ample cover for a few – or 
perhaps more than a few – to offer mutual access at the EU Partner (Single Market), level 
without violating the ‘substantially all sectors’ criterion. Figure 3 generalises Figure 2 to 
sketch a notional UK-EU EIA in services with seven illustrative sectors, ignoring strictures 
about every mode of supply having to be included. Sector 1 is identical to that in figure 2, 
with differences between all five levels of regulation. Sector 2 is similar, but the UK and EU 
offer each other essentially the EU Partner level of access via harmonised regulations and 
mutual recognition.  In Sector 3 the EU partners face exactly the same restrictions as 
nationals, but this is not extended to the EIA, while in sector 4, little integration has been 
achieved and UK-EU mutual access is bound at applied MFN levels.  
Even sector 4, however, appears to meet the WTO’s de facto standard because applied 
regulation is a little less restrictive than the GATS schedule requires. The latter is also true of 
sector 5 but here there has been considerable Single Market liberalisation that has not been 
extended to the UK. In sector 6 both the Single Market and the EIA offer the same treatment 
as nationals receive, whereas in sector 7 the key feature is that neither MFN nor the EIA goes 
any further than the GATS binding. Of all the sectors in figure 3, only sector 7 would de facto 
be considered ‘not covered’ in the EIA.  
 
  
                                                          
35 It goes on to note that ‘Improvements in existing GATS commitments are either a reduction of the 
limitations applicable to market access and/or national treatment, a relaxation of the form of establishment 
under mode 3, further sub-sectors in which commitments are made, and/or additional commitments’ 
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Figure 3 A Notional UK-EU Sectoral Services Deal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Connections between EIAs 
The EU-Korea FTA appears to offer a strong precedent for a UK-EU EIA that, while 
comprehensive in coverage, offers significantly different degrees of integration in different 
sectors. Some of the obligations of this agreement, however, pose a very serious political 
challenge for the EU. Articles 7.8.1 and 7.14.1 of the EU-Korea agreement state that for 
cross-border services trade and establishment respectively,  
unless otherwise provided for in this Article, each Party shall accord to services and 
service suppliers of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords to 
like services and service suppliers of any third country in the context of an economic 
integration agreement signed after the entry into force of this Agreement.   
Hence whatever preferential arrangements for services the EU includes in other EIAs must be 
extended to Korea with the exception (noted under ‘unless… ’) of those that ‘either create an 
      1            2              3              4             5              6             7         Sectors 
GATS Schedule        ;     Applied     ;       EIA         ; 
EU Partners                  ;       National   
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internal market on services and establishment36 or encompass both the right of establishment 
and the approximation of legislation.’ (Annex 7-B)37 
In sum, these clauses mean that either an agreement between the UK and the EU has to be 
extended to Korea in these two critical areas of services trade, or that the UK and the EU 
have to agree that the agreement between them approximates legislation or amounts to an 
internal market with, inter alia, free movement of persons. These are not impossible goals but 
they mean that, in the relevant sectors, the UK will have to commit to a high degree of market 
integration with the UK.  
 
6. Conclusion 
WTO law and practice is perfectly consistent with concluding a UK-EU FTA/EIA that 
includes very deep integration in a number of sectors. However, it does impose some 
constraints. With respect to the elimination of tariff barriers, the parties cannot cherry-pick 
sectors but must maintain comprehensive coverage. This does not prevent coordinating 
external tariffs, and relaxing RoOs, in key sectors to replicate something like a customs union 
in those sectors. With respect to regulatory cooperation, if the EU and UK maintain some 
mutual recognition of each other’s technical regulation and/or CAPs, there is a risk of 
violating relevant WTO MFN provisions under certain scenarios. The MFN obligation here is 
a procedural one: to cooperate with interested parties toward concluding MRAs. Thus far 
there has been no appetite among WTO Members to complain about MRAs.  
In services the GATS also requires EIAs to have substantial sectoral coverage, but the 
requirements for liberalisation within covered sectors are very undemanding. An agreement 
that maintained the current level of (deep) integration in a number of sectors and merely 
bound MFN applied policies in most others would, de facto, be GATS-compatible. Deep 
services liberalization is mostly achieved via MRAs of the parties’ regulations for the 
covered sectors; there are MFN requirements for these, but they are weak. A more significant 
MFN problem in services is that some EU EIAs have MFN clauses that would extend any 
favourable terms offered to the UK to other partners with no reciprocity. This may constrain 
EU enthusiasm for deep integration with the UK.  
What is possible does not necessarily equate with what is desirable – the latter is for the EU 
and UK authorities to decide. However, we note that EU integration has strongly increased 
UK-EU27 trade flows and the development of integrated supply chains, and that physical 
proximity furthers these advantages. Imposing additional tariff barriers and customs 
procedures on existing value chains will be costly and disruptive. The agreement we have 
outlined in this paper is intended to preserve as much as possible of the mutual access that the 
UK and the EU27 currently offer each other. It needs for the sake of formality to be presented 
in the WTO relative to the MFN alternative of ‘no deal’.  However, the obvious way to try to 
negotiate it is from the other direction – to take the status quo as the starting point and ask 
                                                          
36 ‘An internal market on services and establishment means an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of services, capital and persons is ensured. For greater certainty, the European Economic Area 
(EEA) is the only internal market with third countries of the European Union at the time of signature of this 
Agreement.’  - footnote in original. 
37 In addition, Annex 7-C also lists a further 43 specific reservations against MFN.  
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how much change is required to accommodate each side’s red lines. This requires agreement 
in principle that a deep arrangement is sought, and working closely together to design the 
details to meet that objective.   
The first step is to agree the simple tariff-free FTA. It would then be for the UK to decide to 
what extent it wished to coordinate its MFN and preferential tariffs with the EU. We have 
argued elsewhere that the UK should initially adopt the EU tariff schedule through a 
rectification at the WTO – UKTPO (2016) – but that is a short-term expedient. The decision 
here is a longer-run one, and in our view it is very finely balanced. If tariff coordination did 
seem desirable, work would then pass on to coordinating regulations and designing rules of 
origin and their administration in a way that minimised the customs burden. The latter can 
occur only once the UK has worked out its general customs regulations and procedures. Of 
course, these regulations should be as convenient as possible anyway, but we would expect 
that in the presence of coordinated policies, they could be made significantly easier to 
manage.  
Regarding regulation for goods, conformity assessments and services, it is relatively 
straightforward to convert existing harmonisation into MRAs, as compared to the usual 
situation in which trade partners have to build trust in divergent regulatory systems. The issue 
is how to enforce the agreed rules in the UK independently of the CJEU, and how to modify 
MRAs to reflect changing regulation. The UK as the smaller party would have to accept EU 
leadership in most standards, a voluntary reduction in regulatory self-determination in 
exchange for market access.   
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